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ABSTRACT
MARIA NYKYFOROVYCH: Trigger Warnings: When Is Goodwill Impairment Disclosure
Informative?
(Under the direction of Jeffery Abarbanell)
This paper examines the information content of financial statement disclosures related to
goodwill impairment testing after the implementation of the Statement of Financial Accounting
Standards (SFAS) 142. I hand-collect a sample of triggering events that firms disclose at the
time of a goodwill impairment announcement. Factor analysis reveals that impairment reasons
group into three categories: firm-, industry- or economy-related. I find significant price and
volume market reactions to a firm’s decision to impair goodwill, but only if a firm discloses firm-
specific triggering events. This result may explain previous mixed evidence on market reactions
to goodwill impairment announcements that do not account for the triggering event cited by the
firm. Additional findings indicate that consistent with the predictions of Kim and Verrecchia (1994),
firm-specific triggering events increase the post-announcement information asymmetry, and predict
future goodwill impairments when a firm records multiple impairments. Overall, these results
indicate that financial statement users require more detailed firm-specific disclosures related to
goodwill impairment testing. The SEC and FASB might consider this finding while developing
future disclosure guidance for financial statement filers.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
This paper investigates the information content of disclosures related to goodwill impairment
testing under the Statement of Financial Accounting Standards (SFAS) 142 regime. At the time
SFAS 142 was issued (2001) the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) noted that intangi-
ble assets are an increasingly important economic resource for many entities and are an increasing
proportion of the assets acquired in many transactions. As a result, better information about intangi-
ble assets was needed (FASB (2001), p.3). While extensive research analyzing the consequences
of SFAS 142 adoption exists, none of the papers to date have looked into firms’ detailed goodwill
impairment-related disclosure and financial statement users’ reaction to such disclosure. This paper
seeks to fill this void.
Aside from a discussion of SFAS 142 effectiveness, the study of goodwill impairments rep-
resents an interesting area of research for a number of reasons. First, both the magnitude and the
frequency of goodwill impairments increased substantially, suggesting that it is an economically
significant set of events. Second, goodwill impairments are charged against net income, creating a
complex event response system from managers, investors, analysts and other financial statement
users. Third, goodwill is an inherently hard-to-evaluate asset because of considerable managerial
discretion with regards to the impairment recognition timing and amount. This study aims to shed
new light on the issues of SFAS 142 disclosure informativeness and goodwill impairment causes
and consequences.
SFAS 142 is a highly controversial standard. On one hand, standard setters argue that, on
average, SFAS 142 disclosures allow managers to convey private information on a firm’s future
cash flows. Critics, on the other hand, argue that firm managers may use discretion afforded by the
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standard to manage financial reports opportunistically. Moreover, in addition to the points raised by
proponents and critics of SFAS 142, it is possible that the required disclosures may not be useful
to investors or may be pre-empted by information available through other sources during the time
periods that precede goodwill impairment announcements.1 Empirical literature reports mixed
results on the market reaction to goodwill impairments.2 Ramanna and Watts (2012) note that
while SFAS 142 might be net beneficial, they do not find any evidence to this effect. By presenting
descriptive as well as quantitative evidence on the effects of SFAS 142 adoption, this paper takes
an overarching approach in assessing the standard and informs the debate surrounding the issue of
goodwill impairment testing and reporting.
First, I examine whether the market reacts to an additional detailed goodwill impairment-related
disclosure mandated by SFAS 142. I find that the market reaction differs depending on the type of a
triggering event cited by the firm at the time of a goodwill impairment announcement. Furthermore,
in addition to a stock return measure of information content used in prior studies, I employ an
abnormal trading volume measure (Beaver (1968)). Changes in price indicate the average change in
investors’ beliefs while trading volume reflects idiosyncratic reactions to the announcement. This
approach captures changes in expectations of individual investors in response to a firm’s public
disclosures, a market response that is not reflected in various return-based measures of information
content employed by previous studies in this area.3 Again I find that results differ, depending on
the triggering event. These findings may explain previous mixed evidence on market reactions to
goodwill announcements that did not account for the triggering events disclosed by firms at the time
of goodwill impairment recognition.
1For example, if managers report opportunistically, consistent with critics’ concerns, then additional goodwill impair-
ment disclosures result in release of distorted information to which the market does not respond. Alternatively, the
market might see through the information distortion, making required disclosures uninformative.
2Francis et al. (1996) find no significant market reaction to goodwill impairments, while Hirschey and Richardson (2002)
report negative market reaction. Bens et al. (2011) find a decrease in the information content under the SFAS 142
regime; Li and Sloan (2015) conclude that SFAS 142 did not change the information content of goodwill impairment
announcements.
3Chen et al. (2008) use return-earnings regressions to assess the impact of goodwill announcements on firm stock
returns. Bens et al. (2011), Li et al. (2011), Li and Sloan (2015) estimate abnormal stock returns, Hirschey and
Richardson (2002) and Knauer and Wohrmann (2016) calculate cumulative abnormal returns to draw inferences.
2
Second, I find that firm-specific goodwill impairment disclosure helps predict future goodwill
write-downs for firms that record multiple impairments. These results lend support to FASB’s
assertion that SFAS 142 provides financial statement users with better understanding of changes in
goodwill over time, thereby improving their ability to assess a firm’s future profitability and cash
flows. Moreover, this finding suggests that when the SEC requests additional information about
goodwill impairment testing, it should encourage filers to disclose more firm-specific information
about how economic events affect the firm rather than provide a blanket discussion of the economy-
and/or industry-level developments.
Finally, I analyze changes in information asymmetry around public disclosures about good-
will write-downs. I find evidence consistent with the predictions of Kim and Verrecchia (1994)
that suggests that public disclosures of detailed goodwill impairment information induce post-
announcement information acquisition by sophisticated investors, which increases information
asymmetry immediately after the disclosure is made and leads to a differential interpretation of firm
value. Additional tests demonstrate that XBRL introduction amplified this effect, consistent with
findings of Blankespoor et al. (2014) that a reduction in investors’ data aggregation costs may not
serve its intended purpose of leveling the informational playing field. Thus, SFAS 142-mandated
disclosures benefit larger investors that are able to leverage their superior resources and abilities
to gain further trading advantages from public disclosures, consistent with increased concerns of
adverse selection.
In order to conduct the analysis described above, I examine SEC filings on interim annual
(quarterly) impairment tests and collect goodwill impairment-related disclosures such as triggering
events, valuation methods, use of third-party valuators etc. After combining the hand-collected
data with other datasets providing relevant controls from prior literature, the resulting final sample
consists of 227 firms with 472 reported goodwill write-downs. Consistent with firms having
extensive variation in the types of triggering events producing impairments, I identify 16 distinct
triggering event categories.4 Industry-specific factors, poor past operational performance and
4A full list of triggering events is presented in Table 1.1.
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expectation of lower future performance represent the most frequently cited impairment indicators.
This observation is in contrast to the SEC position that considers the decline in market capitalization
as a leading triggering event for goodwill impairment testing. According to the EY report (EY
(2016), p.104), the SEC frequently challenges firms’ decisions not to impair goodwill after a
significant decline in company’s market capitalization. Additionally, I observe that 36 companies
choose not to disclose any information related to their goodwill impairment decision, even though
SFAS 142 specifically requires firms to make such disclosures available in their financial statements.
I first analyze the information content of earnings announcements that disclose a goodwill
impairment. I compare the information content of earnings announcements across three categories
of firms: firms that make a joint goodwill impairment and earnings announcement; firms that have
a positive goodwill balance but do not record a goodwill write-down at the time of the earnings
announcement; and firms with a zero goodwill balance. I conduct univariate comparisons followed
by multivariate analysis that includes controls for time trends and other variables that prior literature
identifies as having an influence on abnormal return volatility and trading volume. I find that
compared to earnings announcements by non-goodwill-impairing firms, joint announcements of
goodwill impairments and earnings result in a greater increase in abnormal return volatility and
abnormal trading volume, indicating higher information content. Additionally, I find that firms with
positive goodwill balances, both goodwill-impairing and non-impairing, experience a higher market
reaction to earnings announcement news than do firms with zero goodwill balances. This result
suggests that news about a non-impairment by positive goodwill firms bears information content
as reflected by abnormal return volatility and abnormal trading volume measures. I compare this
result to earnings announcement market reactions that positive goodwill and zero goodwill firms
experienced before SFAS 142 introduction. Results indicate that, on average, zero goodwill firms
experienced higher market reactions to quarterly earnings announcements than positive goodwill
firms. This finding suggests that SFAS 142 potentially altered the information environment around
the earnings news release, resulting in significant change in the market reaction for firms with
positive goodwill balances.
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Next, I analyze whether the market reaction to goodwill impairments differs depending on the
category of a triggering event cited by a firm at the time of a goodwill write-down announcement.
In addition, I re-estimate the above relation combining the 16 triggering event variables into three
factors using exploratory factor analysis. Two factors group triggering events more commonly
associated with firm-level event disclosures. The remaining factor captures triggering events more
closely aligned with economy-wide or industry-level event types. I find that while some triggering
events are associated with changes in abnormal returns and trading volume, others experience
significant associations with only one or neither of the above measures. For example, a decline
in market capitalization does not result in significant announcement changes in abnormal return
volatility or abnormal trading volume. Intuitively, this is explained by the fact that changes in
stock price are easily observable in periods that precede the goodwill impairment announcement.
Thus, efficient market prices already reflect this information resulting in an insignificant goodwill
write-down market reaction. On the other hand, the disclosure of a firm-specific triggering event
like major customer loss is related to a significant abnormal return volatility and, to a lesser extent,
abnormal trading volume, indicating an adjustment of the market’s prior expectations about a firm
in response to new information. In line with the results of tests examining the individual triggering
events, I find that the two factors tied to the firm-level goodwill impairment-related disclosure are
significantly and positively associated with increases in abnormal return volatility and abnormal
trading volume, while the factor linked with economy and industry-level impairment disclosure does
not have a statistically significant effect on these two outcomes in most regression specifications.
Overall, the results from both sets of tests confirm my prediction that the market response to
goodwill impairment disclosures differs depending on the triggering event type.
An alternative/coincidental explanation for the market reaction to goodwill write-downs is the
level of information asymmetry among trades that exist before and after the public news release. To
explore how information asymmetry may affect observed market reactions to goodwill impairments
I examine changes in bid-ask spreads and stock liquidity around goodwill impairment announcement
dates. My findings are generally consistent with the predictions of Kim and Verrecchia (1994)
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that disclosure of financial accounting information can induce post-announcement information
acquisition by sophisticated investors, which increases information asymmetry and/or differential
interpretations of firm value.
In my final set of tests, I examine whether past triggering events have predictive power to assess
future goodwill impairment probability for firms with multiple impairments. More than half of the
firms in the hand-collected sample recorded multiple goodwill impairments after the introduction of
SFAS 142. Exploiting this fact, I employ an extension of a proportional hazard model that takes into
account time-varying covariates and a possibility of multiple impairments by the same company.
I predict that if triggering event disclosures provide additional useful information to investors in
assessing future performance of the firm (particularly in the realm of its goodwill), then impairments
in the current period are likely to be indicative of potential future impairments. Consistent with this
prediction, I find that firm-level triggering events such as competition, major customer loss or new
legislation/regulation are significantly positively associated with a hazard of subsequent goodwill
impairment recognition. Disclosure of triggering events related to one of the two firm-specific
information factors also indicates a shorter time to the next impairment. This test provides additional
evidence that the enhanced disclosure detail required by SFAS 142 provides financial statement
users with incremental information that is relevant for assessing future goodwill-related outcomes.5
This paper contributes to the literature in several ways. The first is the literature on intangible
assets, to which this study contributes by providing evidence that disclosure of fair value estimates
and details surrounding intangible assets’ valuation process lead to more informative prices, but only
if firms provide firm-specific disclosures of facts and circumstances that directly affect fair values
of such assets. Additionally, this paper provides initial evidence that SFAS 142 altered earnings
announcements market response for firms with positive goodwill balances. Before SFAS 142 was
implemented zero goodwill firms, on average, experienced a higher market reaction to earnings
announcements than positive goodwill firms. After the adoption of the new standard, however,
5This is in contrast to the findings of Hayn and Hughes (2006). Analyzing single impairments that follow goodwill-
creating mergers or acquisitions, they find that the amount and quality of goodwill impairment disclosures do not allow
investors to effectively evaluate the appropriateness of management determinations regarding goodwill write-downs.
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positive goodwill firms experience consistently stronger earnings announcement market responses,
suggesting that the absence of a goodwill impairment in the earnings announcement also conveys
news to the market.
The second stream of literature is that on real consequences of accounting regulation. This study
informs the debate on the market impact of SFAS 142, a highly controversial standard. I demonstrate
that the market response magnitude differs depending on a type of triggering events disclosed by
a firm at the time of a goodwill impairment decision. Firm-specific disclosures consistently
demonstrate higher information content over the economy- and industry-related discussions. This
result suggests that financial statement users require more detailed firm-specific disclosures related
to goodwill impairment testing and write-down recognition. The SEC and FASB might consider
this finding while developing future disclosure guidance for financial statement filers. As for the
empirical literature, this result may explain previous mixed findings that indicated weak or almost
non-existent market reaction to goodwill impairment announcements. The degree of market response
may vary depending on a sample composition in terms of time period, industry representation
and/or underlying triggering events distribution.6 Furthermore, I contribute to the literature that
studies determinants of goodwill impairments by demonstrating that if a firm records multiple
goodwill impairments, certain past triggering events affect the probability of subsequent goodwill
write-downs by the same firm. This finding lends support to FASB’s assertion that SFAS 142
provides financial statements users with better understanding of changes in goodwill over time,
thereby improving their ability to assess a firm’s future profitability and cash flows.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 discusses previous research and
develops testable hypotheses. Data sources and data collection procedure is described in Section 3.
Section 4 discusses methodology employed in this study, while Section 5 reviews sample descriptive
statistics and empirical results. Section 6 concludes.
6The use of alternative market reaction measures (cumulative abnormal returns (CARs), buy-and-hold returns (BHARs))
does not alter these results. For a discussion of measures of information content employed in this study see Section
2.2.1.
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CHAPTER 2
LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESIS
DEVELOPMENT
2.1 Related Literature
Substantial accounting literature analyzes asset write-downs and long-lived asset impairments,
including those of goodwill. One stream of literature analyzes whether companies use goodwill
impairments to manage earnings in the form of earnings smoothing or big bath accounting. Zucca
and Campbell (1992) find that a majority of asset write-downs occur in periods with unexpectedly
low earnings, consistent with big bath behavior. Furthermore, over a quarter of write-downs
appeared to follow a pattern of income smoothing. Rees et al. (1996) find that companies tend
to write down assets in periods when earnings are low relative to industry medians. Francis et al.
(1996) report that asset impairments are less likely for companies with poor performance and with
unusually good performance, the opposite of what would be expected if write-offs were motivated
by big bath accounting and income smoothing. Riedl (2004) finds that post-SFAS 121 write-offs
are less strongly associated with economic factors and more strongly associated with big bath
accounting.
Several studies analyze whether managers respond to managerial or firm-level incentives and
attempt to accelerate or delay impairments. One of the main concerns for managers that consider
goodwill impairment recognition is that they may violate debt covenants that relate to the balance
sheet or income statement key ratios. Beatty and Weber (2006) and Ramanna and Watts (2012) find
that companies are less likely to write off goodwill if they face binding debt covenants. Studies by
Francis et al. (1996), Beatty and Weber (2006) and Ramanna and Watts (2012) also demonstrate
that managers are concerned about reputational effects of goodwill write-down recognition. Longer-
11
serving CEOs may be reluctant to write off goodwill because the losses may reflect negatively on
the M&A transactions which they initiated in earlier periods, while new CEOs might be inclined to
accelerate goodwill impairments to start their tenure with a clean slate. Beatty and Weber (2006)
and Ramanna and Watts (2012) also find evidence that indicates that the likelihood of companies
writing off goodwill is lower if their CEO’s pay package includes a cash bonus.
Evidence on the market reaction to asset impairments is mixed. For example, Strong and
Meyer (1987) found positive reactions to asset write-offs while Elliott and Shaw (1988) document a
negative market response. Francis et al. (1996), examining several types of asset write-downs, find
little to no market reaction to goodwill impairment announcements. On the other hand, Hirschey
and Richardson (2002) document that the information effects narrowly tied to goodwill write-
off announcements are typically negative and material, on the order of 2-3% of the company’s
stock price. Following SFAS 142 adoption several studies observe a decline in market reaction
to goodwill announcements. For example, Bens et al. (2011) present exploratory evidence of a
decrease in the information content of goodwill impairments manifested through a weakened (no
change in) reaction to impairment announcements for the high (low) information asymmetry and
larger (smaller) firms. The authors attribute their findings to the increasing complexities of applying
SFAS 142 that results in an increased noise level of reported impairments.
This study is related to work by Li et al. (2011) and Bens et al. (2011) that explore the market
reaction to goodwill write-downs announcements, the information content of goodwill impairments
and determinants of goodwill write-off decisions. These studies look at all goodwill impairments
as one homogeneous group, and do not take SFAS 142 mandated disclosures into consideration.
Taking a different approach, I am able to categorize goodwill impairments into subgroups based
on triggering events disclosed in firms’ financial statements and analyze market reactions for
each subgroup separately. Additionally, analysis of pre- and post-SFAS 142 market reaction to
earnings/goodwill announcement is based on industry- and size-matched firms with positive or
zero goodwill balances, and does not depend on the arbitrary determination of a firm’s potential
indicators of goodwill impairments that were not recognized in a timely manner.
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Assessment of the predictive power of disclosures related to goodwill impairment testing
and recognition relates to the work of Hayn and Hughes (2006). Analyzing single impairments
that follow goodwill-creating mergers or acquisitions, they find that the amount and quality of
goodwill impairment disclosures do not allow investors to effectively evaluate the appropriateness
of management determinations regarding goodwill write-downs. In contrast to Hayn and Hughes
(2006), I examine firms that report multiple goodwill impairments and assess the predictive power
of triggering events disclosed at the time of the impairment announcement.
2.2 Hypotheses Development
2.2.1 Assessment of Information Content of SFAS-142-mandated Disclosures
Seminal papers by Ball and Brown (1968) and Beaver (1968) operationalize the concept of
information content in the accounting literature. Beaver (1968) observes that information flow
manifests itself through return and volume volatility around the announcement period. Changes in
price indicate the average change in investors’ beliefs while trading volume reflects idiosyncratic
reactions to the announcement. Analytical models of trade posit that the price reaction to an
information event is a function of the precision of the announced information relative to the average
precision of investors’ prior information and the surprise contained in the information signal
plus noise. Based on the analytical model proposed by Kim and Verrecchia (1991), Atiase and
Bamber (1994) note that predisclosure information asymmetry causes investors to form differential
predisclosure expectations, which result in differential belief revisions when annual earnings are
announced. These differential belief revisions, in turn, induce trading activity.
I hypothesize that the market reaction to a goodwill impairment depends on the nature of a
triggering event that gave rise to the write-down. Real market effects of goodwill impairment
announcements might be concealed if underlying triggering events are associated with share prices
moving in the opposite directions. Moreover, Beaver (1968) posits that an important distinction
between the price and volume tests is that the former reflects changes in the expectations of the
13
market as a whole while the latter reflects changes in the expectations of individual investors.
Consequently, information released by a firm might be neutral in the sense of not changing the
expectations of the overall market, manifesting in no price reaction. At the same time, if revealed
information alters the expectations of individual investors, there would be shifts in portfolio positions
reflected in the trading volume. Thus, a price-based measure of information content might be less
sensitive to a goodwill announcement report than a volume-based measure. For example, a firm
undergoing restructuring might release a restructuring plan well ahead of the earnings/goodwill
announcement. In efficient markets this information will already be reflected in the stock price by
the time a firm cites Restructuring as a triggering event for a goodwill impairment. However,
such disclosure might influence individual investors’ expectations, resulting in significant changes
in abnormal trading volume after the write-down announcement. Overall, I expect triggering events
related to information publicly observable in prior periods to have less information content than
triggering events that reveal private information of a firm’s insiders as the former category implies
less information asymmetry between the firm and the market than the latter category does.
Previous research (Francis et al. (1996), Riedl (2004)) generally classifies factors related to
asset impairment decisions into economy-, industry- and firm-level categories. Intuitively, I argue
that the economy- and industry-level information is readily available and easy to obtain, thus
resulting in less information asymmetry and more homogeneous predisclosure investor expectations.
Firm-level information, on the other hand, is scarcer and harder to acquire resulting in higher levels
of predisclosure information asymmetry. Atiase and Bamber (1994) find that the greater the level of
predisclosure information asymmetry, the greater the disclosure’s effect on the investors’ trading
activity. Additionally, (Kothari (2001), p.115) notes that the use of the firm-specific component
alone enhances the power of the tests of the information content of accounting reports. Based on
these arguments, I formulate the following hypotheses:
H1: The market reaction to goodwill impairment announcements differs based on the underlying
triggering event cited by the firm:
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H1a: Firms that disclose firm-level triggering events experience higher abnormal stock return
volatility than do firms that disclose triggering events related to economy- and industry-level
information.
H1b: Firms that disclose firm-level triggering events experience higher abnormal stock trad-
ing volume than do firms that disclose triggering events related to economy- and industry-level
information.
2.2.2 The Relation Between Impairment-Related Disclosures and Information Asymmetry
The primary motivation for hypotheses above relates to whether goodwill impairment disclo-
sures have information content, depending on the type of triggering event. Another possibility is
that information asymmetry systematically changes the flow and/or amount of informed trading that
takes place around earnings/goodwill impairment announcement dates.
The relation between goodwill impairment-related disclosures and information asymmetry
is an empirical question. Kim and Verrecchia (1994) present two ways to characterize public
disclosure, each of which has different empirical implications. On one hand, public announcement
may reduce information asymmetry in the economy where shareholders affiliated with the firm
have superior information about the firm’s performance based on their affiliation. In this case,
public disclosure reveals private information held by informed traders to market makers. As a result,
bid-ask spreads are wider for an extended period of time before the disclosure occurs and narrow
immediately after the news release. Thus, market makers increase the bid-ask spread during the
period of greatest information asymmetry (which also lowers liquidity) to protect against traders
with superior information, and lower the spread when news reduces information asymmetry (and
improves liquidity) (Kim and Verrecchia (1994), p.44). This leads to the following hypotheses:
H2: Bid-ask spreads increase and liquidity decreases prior to earnings announcements that
include a goodwill impairment.
H3: The effect on bid-ask spreads and liquidity prior to earnings announcements is greatest
when goodwill impairments are associated with firm-specific triggering events.
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Alternatively, some sophisticated market traders (”market experts”) acquire new private infor-
mation in response to public goodwill impairment disclosures. These informed judgments, in turn,
create information asymmetries between traders and market makers, resulting in higher bid-ask
spreads and less liquid market as a direct consequence of more disclosure by the firm. Additionally,
in this equilibrium the trading volume generated by market experts is greater than the volume
they drive out, meaning that less liquidity does not translate into less trading activity around news
announcements (Kim and Verrecchia (1994)). The preceding discussion leads to the following
hypotheses:
H4: Bid-ask spreads increase and liquidity decreases after earnings announcements that include
a goodwill impairment.
H5: The influence on bid-ask spreads and liquidity after earnings announcements is greatest
when goodwill impairments are associated with firm-specific triggering events.
2.2.3 Do Current Impairment-Related Disclosures Relate to Subsequent Future Impair-
ments?
Hayn and Hughes (2006) posit that the information content of goodwill impairment-related
disclosure can be assessed through determination of the predictive power of items disclosed after
SFAS 142 adoption. If information gained from the market and financial statements makes goodwill
impairments fairly predictable, this suggests that market participants gain valuable information
through SFAS 142 disclosures. Alternatively, lack of predictive power suggests that companies do
not disclose sufficient information to provide users with a better understanding of the expectations
about and changes in goodwill over time, as intended by FASB at the time of SFAS 142 release.
A different stream of goodwill impairment research documents that multiple goodwill impair-
ments recorded by the same firm have become more frequent since the implementation of SFAS 142
(Li et al. (2011)). The hand-collected sample for this study confirms this finding: more than half of
sample firms have 2 or more impairments during 2003-2013. I exploit this fact to assess whether
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disclosures about previous goodwill impairments help predict future goodwill write-downs. This
approach is different from previous research that studied predictive power of impairments based on
acquisition characteristics (Hayn and Hughes (2006), Gu and Lev (2011)) and firm performance
(Hayn and Hughes (2006), Li et al. (2011)).
I hypothesize that information about factors and circumstances that lead a firm to recognize
one impairment might help in the evaluation of subsequent goodwill impairment probabilities.
Therefore, I formulate the following hypothesis:
H6: Current goodwill impairment-related triggering events are associated with the likelihood
of subsequent goodwill write-downs by the same firm.
The presence of significant associations between current triggering events and the likelihood of
ensuing goodwill write-downs would indicate that financial statements provide information that
helps gain a better understanding of a firm’s subsequent performance, as intended by SFAS 142
(FASB (2001), p.4).
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CHAPTER 3
DATA AND MEASUREMENT
3.1 Data Collection
Data sample for this study comes from multiple sources. I begin by identifying all quarterly
goodwill impairment observations spanning years 2003-2013 in the Compustat database. For a
randomly selected subsample of firms I hand-collect goodwill impairment-related disclosures from
annual (quarterly) reports located at the Securities and Exchange Commission’s EDGAR database
website. Within the reports, information regarding goodwill impairment testing, triggering events
and other SFAS 142-related disclosures are located in several different sections. Among them
are the following: Risk factors; Management’s discussion and analysis of financial condition and
operations; Critical accounting policies and estimates; Significant accounting policies ; Footnotes
on goodwill and other intangibles.
In the next step these data are merged with stock return data from CRSP database, CEO tenure
and compensation data from Execucomp database, debt covenant violation risk data from Demerjian
and Owens (2016) and earnings surprise and analyst following data from IBES. Macroeconomic
control variables come from the Federal Reserve Economic Data (FRED) database of the Federal
Reserve Bank of St.Louis. Additionally, some supplemental control variables are obtained from the
Capital IQ database. Table 3.1 contains a full list of variable definitions and respective data sources.
I apply the following sampling procedure (see Table 3.2). First, I exclude observations that
have missing annual and/or quarterly reports from the EDGAR database. Next, I drop observations
that do not have sufficient information for variables of interest, ARVOL and ATVOL. In particular,
I require at least 150 days of volume and return data before the goodwill impairment announcement
(day 0) and 150 observations after the announcement. Additionally, I exclude firm-quarters with
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daily volume and return data missing during the event period, i.e., days -1, 0 and +1. Finally, I drop
observations that are incorrectly classified as goodwill impairments by Compustat. Hodder et al.
(2013) provide examples of Compustat problems related to reported goodwill data and recommend
hand collection of goodwill impairment-related disclosures as the only feasible way of ensuring
data accuracy. Thus, I identify incorrect Compustat observations by studying each firm’s annual
and/or quarterly report that discusses SFAS 142-related procedures. I find that roughly 20% of
the randomly selected goodwill impairment observations do not reflect respective firm disclosures.
Typically, classification errors happen for the following reasons: (1) An asset other than goodwill
is impaired. However, this asset write-down is classified as a goodwill impairment in Compustat.
Impairments of radio broadcast licenses represent one example of such a misclassification; (2) An
annual/quarterly report explicitly states that no goodwill impairments were recorded after SFAS-142
testing. However, Compustat goodwill impairment field for the respective quarter is populated.
Another potentially problematic data issue is related to Compustat-reported goodwill impair-
ment magnitudes. In some instances reported goodwill write-down numbers represent a sum of
impairments across several different asset types, both tangible and intangible. This issue is important
in settings where goodwill impairment magnitude is used during sample construction (for example,
only impairments that exceed a certain threshold are included in a sample). Additionally, these
observations introduce noise to regression estimations that use goodwill write-down magnitude as a
dependent variable. In my sample, I replace Compustat-reported numbers if correct goodwill im-
pairment amounts could be traced in annual and/or quarterly reports. Otherwise, such observations
are dropped from the analysis.
3.2 Goodwill Impairment Announcement Date
For the purposes of this paper, the goodwill announcement date is defined as a date of a
quarterly earnings announcement (Compustat item RDQ) which coincides with a goodwill impair-
ment announcement. To assess the reasonableness of this assumption, I turn to Capital IQ Key
Developments section which tracks all major company events as they become publicly available
19
through various data sources, including company press-releases, conference calls, analyst forecast
revisions etc. I randomly select 100 impairment observations from the hand-collected sample
and compare Compustat goodwill announcement date to the earliest mention of the respective
impairment in the Capital IQ’s Key Developments section. I find that only 3 out of 100 impairments
have a separate and earlier goodwill impairment announcement date than the joint earnings/goodwill
announcement date from Compustat. Thus, it is unlikely that such announcement date discrepancies
can significantly bias against the finding information content in goodwill impairments in this study.
3.3 Matched Samples
Simultaneous release of earnings and impairment news requires separation of market responses
to these events. I perform a matching procedure based on the industry classification (2-digit SIC
code) and company size (market capitalization) which results in the following 2 samples. The first
sample consists of companies with positive goodwill balances but no goodwill impairments for at
least a year before and after the goodwill announcement date by a matching goodwill-impairing
firm. I refer to this sample as a positive goodwill sample. The second sample contains companies
that, according to Compustat, have zero goodwill balance in every quarter during years 2003-2013.
I refer to this sample as a zero goodwill sample. These firms serve as an alternative benchmark
to a positive goodwill sample in that they represent a control for all earnings announcement news
except for the possibility of an impairment. Therefore, all test results are reported for 3 groups of
companies: goodwill-impairing firms, positive goodwill firms, and zero goodwill firms.
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Table 3.2: Sample Selection Procedure.
Firm-
Quarters Firms
Available goodwill impairment observations (Compustat), 2003-
2013
8159 4003
Obserations randomly selected 1631 620
Less
CRSP return/volume information missing 393 92
Edgar annual/quarterly report missing 410 163
Compustat observations incorrecly classified as goodwill impair-
ments
244 98
Compustat observations with incorrect goodwill impairment mag-
nitudes
112 40
Final sample 472 227
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CHAPTER 4
METHODOLOGY
4.1 Measures of Abnormal Return Volatility and Abnormal Trading Volume
Consistent with previous research (Beaver (1968),Landsman et al. (2012)), I measure the
volatility of stock returns at the time of goodwill impairment announcements as the ratio of the
event window return volatility to the return volatility during the non-event period. First, I estimate
the following daily market model-adjusted returns regression:
uit = Rit − (ai + biRmt) (4.1)
where Rit is the stock return of firm i for day t, Rmt is the market return for day t of the market
capitalization-based decile that firm i belongs to. Firm i’s market model parameter estimates ai and
bi are calculated during the non-event period. The non-event period is defined as days t-150 to t-10
and t+10 to t+150 relative to the Compustat earnings announcement date, t=0.
Following DeFond et al. (2007) and Landsman et al. (2012), abnormal return volatility
(ARV OL) is calculated as a natural log of a ratio of the mean of squared market model ad-
justed returns, u2it, to the variance of firm i’s market model residuals during the non-event period,
σ2i , where t=-1,0,+1 relative to announcement day 0.
ARV OLi = ln
u2it
σ2i
(4.2)
Abnormal trading volume (ATV OL) is defined as a natural log of a ratio of the mean of the
event-period volume, Vit, to the average estimation-period volume, Vi (Landsman et al. (2012)):
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ATV OLit = ln
Vit
Vi
(4.3)
Daily volume during the event announcement period, Vit, is shares of firm i traded during day
t divided by shares outstanding of firm i for days t-150 to t-10 and t+10 to t+150 relative to the
Compustat earnings announcement date, t=0.
4.2 Market Reactions to Earnings/Goodwill Announcements
I begin my test of whether abnormal return volatility and abnormal trading volume increase
following a goodwill impairment announcement by estimating the following regression equations,
by triggering event:
ARV OLit = β0 + β1TrigEventit + β2Timeit + β3Sizeit
+ β4NumEstit + β5RepLagit + β6Levit + β7Lossit
+ β8SUEit
(4.4)
ATV OLit = β0 + β1TrigEventit + β2Timeit + β3Sizeit
+ β4NumEstit + β5RepLagit + β6Levit + β7Lossit
+ β8SUEit
(4.5)
where ARVOL and ATVOL are abnormal return volatility and abnormal trading volume as defined
in section 4.1, and i and t refer to firm and quarter-year, respectively. TrigEvent is an indicator
variable specifying a particular triggering event that was cited by a goodwill-impairing firm as a
reason underlying the impairment decision in a particular quarter-year.
Additionally, following Landsman and Maydew (2002) and Landsman et al. (2012), I include
various control variables identified as potentially affecting stock return and volume volatility. Time
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trend variable, Time, accounts for possible time trends in ARV OL and ATV OL. Size is a natural
logarithm of the market value of equity measured at the end of each quarter-year; NumEst is
the number of analysts issuing forecasts during each firm-quarter-year observation. The reporting
lag, RepLag, is calculated as a difference between the earnings announcement date as reported
by Compustat and the end date of the respective impairment quarter. Lev is leverage computed
as a ratio of total liabilities to total assets, both of which are measured at the quarter end. Loss
is an indicator variable equal to 1 if a firm reports negative quarterly earnings per share, and zero
otherwise. SUE is a mean standardized earnings surprise as reported quarterly by IBES database.
4.3 Factor Analysis
Since various triggering events are not independent and to increase the power of tests because
of a small number of observations in certain triggering events categories, I combine the triggering
event variables into factors using exploratory factor analysis (see Table 4.1). Initially, the number
of components extracted is equal to the number of variables being analyzed, necessitating that a
decision must be made on how many components are truly meaningful and should be retained for
rotation and interpretation. I use a combination approach to determine the number of meaningful
components to retain (Hatcher (1994)). In particular, besides the eigenvalue criterion, I consider
results of the scree test, proportion of variance accounted for and interpretability criteria. Conse-
quently, I retain the 3 factors described below. The scree test indicates that Factor 1 is positively
associated with the following variables: poor past operational performance, the expectation of lower
future performance and declined market capitalization. Factor 2 demonstrates the highest loadings
on the economy- and industry-level triggering events. Finally, Factor 3 is positively associated with
competition, major customer loss and introduction of new legislation or regulation affecting the
firm. Together, the three factors explain up to 95% of the data variance.
After the varimax rotation, the rotated factor pattern demonstrates a so-called ”simple structure”
through the following characteristics: (a) Most of the variables have relatively high factor loadings
on only one component and near zero loadings on the other components, and (b) most components
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Table 4.1: Exploratory Factor Analysis
Triggering event Factor1 Factor2 Factor3
Business restructuring -17 -15 1
Recognition after denial -19 2 -8
Expectation of low performance -36 11 14
Decline in market cap -36 12 -13
Poor operational performance -45 -8 16
Industry Factors -9 48 11
Economic Factors -9 41 -3
Other 3 11 -2
New legislation or regulation -2 -3 40
Major customer loss -2 -8 31
Competition -1 5 26
Currency issues/exchange rates 4 11 16
Rising costs -4 10 14
Asset sale/expectation of sale/closure -9 5 8
Restatement to previous impairment 1 -3 -1
Eigenvalue 3.40 1.56 1.03
This table presents factor loadings based on the exploratory factor analysis. All loadings are
multiplied by 100.
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have relatively high factor loadings for some variables, and near-zero loadings for the remaining
variables. As for the interpretability criteria, variables that load on each given factor share the
same conceptual meaning. Factor 1 is associated with the firm-level operational performance, with
declining market capitalization being a reflection of the poor performance. Factor 2 is strongly
influenced by the economy- and industry-level circumstances, both of which are external factors
affecting a firm. Finally, Factor 3 is associated with firm-level events like major customer loss,
increased competition1 or regulatory developments directly affecting a firm. I conclude that even
though I retain three factors, they generally fall into two main categories: firm-specific and economy-
/industry-specific factors.
4.4 Predicting Goodwill Impairments
Survival analysis is often used when researchers work with longitudinal data that contain
information about the occurrence of events. One of the main tools of survival analysis is propor-
tional hazard model, where event hazard (which sometimes can be interpreted as an instantaneous
probability) is a product of a baseline hazard function and an exponentiated linear function of
fixed covariates. The classical assumption of the proportional hazard model is that covariates
do not change over time and that there is at most one event for each subject. Previous research
(for example, see Hayn and Hughes (2006)) uses a Cox hazard model to identify determinants of
the goodwill impairment with an underlying assumption that no firm experiences more than one
goodwill impairment. However, post-142 evidence suggests that this assumption might no longer
be reasonable: as demonstrated by the hand-collected sample (Table 4.2), the majority of the firms
experience more than one goodwill impairment between 2003-2013.
In this paper I extend the standard assumptions of a proportional hazard model to estimate a
firm’s probability of recording a goodwill impairment, conditional on the time elapsed since the
firm’s previous goodwill write-down and triggering events that were disclosed by a firm at the time
1In this setting I interpret competition as a firm-specific triggering event rather than an industry-specific one. For more
on the premise of this interpretation see Bushman et al. (2016).
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Table 4.2: Distribution of Firms by Number of Goodwill Impairments, 2003-2013.
Number of Impairments Number of Firms
1 103
2 67
3 26
4 15
5 7
6 3
7 3
9 1
10 2
of the last goodwill write-down. The proportionality assumption in the Cox hazard model means that
the effect of each covariate is the same at all points of time. In the case of time-varying covariates
like firm size, leverage, etc. this assumption is violated because time-dependent covariates change
at different rates for different companies. Hence the ratio of firm’s hazards do not remain constant
and model parameters have to be estimated using the partial likelihood method.
Recognition of multiple impairments by the same firm introduces possible dependence structure
between subsequent impairments. Failure to take dependence into account may lead to standard
error estimates that are biased downward and test statistics that are biased upward. To correct for
dependence among multiple impairments recorded by the same firm I employ a robust variance
estimator (modified sandwich estimator). This method was developed for Cox regression by Wei
et al. (1989) and does not require any assumptions about the nature or structure of the dependence.
For a detailed description see Therneau and Grambsch (2000).
32
I use the following hazard model for individual triggering events:
log hi(t) = αi(t) +
13∑
k=1
βkTrigEventki
+ β14Sizei(t) + β15Leveragei(t) + β16DebtCovi(t)
+ β17Tenurei(t) + β18Bonusi(t) + β19MngmtChangei(t)
+ β20ImpPrevQi(t) + β21GDPChUS(t)
+ β22GDPChEU(t) + β23Will5000Ch(t) + β24V IXCh(t)
(4.6)
and triggering events factors:
log hi(t) = αi(t) + β1Factor1i + β2Factor2i + β3Factor3i
+ β4Sizei(t) + β5Leveragei(t) + β6DebtCovi(t)
+ β7Tenurei(t) + β8Bonusi(t) + β9MngmtChangei(t)
+ β10ImpPrevQi(t) + β11GDPChUS(t)
+ β12GDPChEU(t) + β13Will5000Ch(t) + β14V IXCh(t).
(4.7)
In specifications (4.6) and (4.7) the function hi(t) defines a hazard of subsequent impairment
for company i, t is time since previous impairment, αi(t) is a baseline hazard, which captures each
firm’s intrinsic temporal goodwill impairment pattern. This formulation also includes a covariate
function, which captures the influence of other variables (such as triggering events, size, leverage,
etc.) on the hazard of multiple write-downs. Triggering events in equation (4.6) are defined in Table
1.1. Control variables are defined in Table 3.1.
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CHAPTER 5
RESULTS
5.1 Descriptive Statistics
Descriptive statistics for data used in this study are presented in Tables 1-8. Table 1.1 provides
a list of and disclosure examples and counts for all triggering events hand-collected from EDGAR’s
annual/quarterly reports. I identify 16 distinct triggering event categories. Industry-specific fac-
tors, as well as poor past operational performance and expectation of lower future performance
represent the most frequently disclosed impairment indicators with 114, 126 and 144 observations,
respectively. The Not disclosed category represents 36 reports that did not provide any information
related to the goodwill impairment decision. Additionally, this table provides examples of disclosure
related to observations classified as Compustat error and Recognition after denial to provide
readers with a better understanding of the sample classification process.
Table 4.2 shows that the number of firms with multiple goodwill impairments (124) exceeds
that of firms with just one goodwill write-down (103). Additionally, Table 5.1 classifies multiple
goodwill impairment observations into two categories: First impairment, representing the first
impairment recorded by a firm since the beginning of the sample; and Subsequent impairment,
representing all subsequent goodwill write-downs that followed after the First impairment
recognition.
Table 5.1 presents goodwill impairment frequency counts by the calendar year and quarter.
Consistent with the practice of conducting SFAS 142-related testing at the end of a calendar year,
the majority of goodwill impairment recognitions occur during the fourth quarter of each year. The
number of impairments is notably higher during years 2008-2009. This result is similar for a general
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Table 5.1: Distribution of Goodwill Impairments by Year/Quarter and Impairment Sequence
Number.
Year Quarter
All
Impairments
First
Impairments
Subsequent
Impairments
2003 2 10 10 0
3 9 8 1
4 11 8 3
2004 1 2 2 0
2 2 2 0
3 8 6 2
4 6 4 2
2005 1 4 3 1
2 5 4 1
3 4 2 2
4 15 12 3
2006 1 5 4 1
2 4 2 2
3 2 2 0
4 9 4 5
2007 1 4 4 0
2 3 2 1
3 5 3 2
4 24 16 8
2008 1 13 7 6
2 21 12 9
3 17 3 14
4 63 31 32
2009 1 23 13 10
2 20 9 11
3 11 2 9
4 21 6 15
2010 1 5 2 3
2 12 3 9
3 6 0 6
4 16 6 10
2011 1 8 4 4
2 5 2 3
3 4 0 4
4 22 7 15
2012 1 6 0 6
2 13 5 8
3 12 3 9
4 15 3 12
2013 1 4 1 3
2 11 2 9
3 12 4 8
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population of goodwill impairments available in Compustat, reflecting the influence of the global
financial crisis.
Descriptive statistics for goodwill impairing, positive goodwill and zero goodwill samples
are reported in Tables 3.3 and 3.4. As expected, all three samples are close in terms of mean
and median firm size. Goodwill-impairing firms carry a slightly larger goodwill balance than do
positive goodwill firms. On average, firms across all samples are followed by 9 analysts and have
a reporting lag of 32 to 36 days. Zero goodwill firms have almost twice as much leverage as do
goodwill-impairing and positive goodwill firms. Mean reported loss (negative earnings per share)
magnitudes are almost identical for goodwill-impairing and zero goodwill firms (23 and 26 cents
per share, respectively). In contrast, positive goodwill firms without goodwill write-downs report an
average loss of 8 cents per share.
5.2 The Information Content of Goodwill Impairment Disclosures
Figure 5.1 presents a plot of daily abnormal return volatility (abnormal trading volume) for three
sample categories - goodwill impairing, positive goodwill and zero goodwill firms – in event time
surrounding goodwill announcements. In particular, following (Landsman et al., 2012), I calculate
daily ARV OL (ATV OL) and regress it on event day fixed effects. The figure plots the coefficient
estimates from this regression, which represent the conditional mean ARV OL (ATV OL) on each
day. Consistent with previous research findings ((Beaver, 1968), (Landsman and Maydew, 2002)) I
document an increase in daily ARV OL (ATV OL) in the days surrounding the news announcement
date. Figure 5.1 demonstrates that firms with positive goodwill balances, both goodwill-impairing
and non-impairing, experience a higher market reaction to earnings announcement news than do
firms with zero goodwill balances 1 that represent a benchmark for earnings announcement reactions
with no goodwill implications. This result suggests non-impairment by positive goodwill firms is
informative as reflected by the ARV OL and ATV OL measures. For example, if the market expects
1As reported in Figure 5.2, the opposite was true before the introduction of SFAS 142.
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Figure 5.1: Market reaction to earnings announcements by goodwill-impairing, positive goodwill
and zero goodwill firms in 2003-2013, i.e. after SFAS 142 introduction. Left panel presents results
for abnormal trading volume, right panel - for abnormal return volatility.
Figure 5.2: Market reaction to earnings announcements by positive goodwill and zero goodwill
firms in 1991-2001, i.e. before SFAS 142 introduction. Left panel presents results for abnormal
trading volume, right panel - for abnormal return volatility.
a goodwill impairment but a firm does not record it, the market prior expectations’ adjustments
manifest themselves through abnormal return volatility and/or abnormal trading volume.
As for goodwill-impairing firms, the magnitude of the ARV OL and ATV OL increases exceed
the respective changes in both measures for the similar industry- and size-matched control firms
that do not impair goodwill during the same quarter. The increased information content of goodwill-
impairing firms’ disclosures is evident in both figures.
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I repeat the same analysis based on subsamples representing firms with particular triggering
events disclosed in financial statements at the time of goodwill impairment news release. For
parsimony, I report 3 representative figures for the following categories of triggering events - com-
petition, declined market capitalization and economic factors (see Figure 5.3). When competition
is disclosed as a triggering event for a goodwill impairment, it induces a significant spike in both
abnormal return volatility and abnormal trading volume measures, consistent with a revision of
expectations by both the overall market and individual investors. Disclosure of a decline in market
capitalization as a reason for the goodwill impairment, on the other hand, does not seem to be
associated with the significant market reaction. This is consistent with this information being
already priced by the market since the decline in stock market price is easily observable before
the impairment announcement. Finally, economic factors seem to be reflected by abnormal return
volatility, but not abnormal trading. These initial observations lend support to hypothesis 1 in that
they demonstrate a differential market reaction to goodwill announcement news depending on the
particular triggering event disclosed by a firm.
Table 5.2 presents results of paired t-tests assessing whether changes in mean abnormal return
volatility (ARV OL) and abnormal trading volume (ATV OL) of goodwill-impairing firms relative
to those of positive-goodwill and zero-goodwill matched firms are statistically significant. For
parsimony, triggering events with insignificant results for both information content measures were
dropped from the table.
On the day of a goodwill impairment announcement, almost every triggering event results
in a positive and statistically significant change in ARV OL if compared to changes in abnormal
return volatility of zero-goodwill firms. Major customer loss and Rising costs are the only
exceptions demonstrating a statistically significant positive difference on the next day (day 1)
after the goodwill impairment announcement (day 0). As for changes in abnormal trading volume
ATV OL, significant and positive reaction is present during both day 0 and day 1 for most of the
triggering event categories. These results suggest that disclosure of information surrounding a firm’s
decision to impair goodwill delivers (or leads to the production of) new information.
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Next, I compare differences in disclosure’s information content between goodwill-impairing
firms and non-impairing positive-goodwill firms since these two company categories closely re-
semble each other based on industry and size. On day 0, Industry − specific factors, increased
Competition, poor operational past and future performance and Business restructuring result
in positive and statistically significant changes in ARV OL, indicating changes in expectations
of the market as a whole. As already mentioned above, the market reaction to Major customer
loss and Rising costs, while initially insignificant, becomes significantly positive on day 1. The
ATV OL measure reveals significantly positive coefficients on Asset sale/expectation of sale
and Strategic change, suggesting that these triggering events are associated with revisions of
idiosyncratic expectations. Positive coefficients on these impairment indicators reveal an increase
in the information content of the disclosure. Consistent with Figure 5.3 analyzed above, Decline
in market capitalization does not generate a significant market response. Firms that announce
goodwill impairment but provide no further details (Not disclosed) experience significantly positive
change in abnormal return volatility on day 0. However, this result reverses on day 1 with ARV OL
becoming significantly negative.
Taken together, these results strongly support Hypothesis 1. The market reaction to goodwill
impairments depends on the nature of the underlying event that resulted in impairment recognition.
Positive coefficients for triggering events indicate an increase in information content of goodwill
impairment-related disclosure under the SFAS-142 regime. Additionally, this evidence provides a
possible explanation to previous research findings that documented non-existent or weak market
reaction to goodwill write-downs. First, an insignificant market reaction to some triggering events
might obscure the significance of other impairment indicators if an average effect is measured across
all impairment observations during a particular period of time. Second, use of two- or three-day
moving averages during the market reaction measurement period might also result in insignificant
findings as demonstrated above by the Not disclosed category of events.
Table 5.3 reports the results from estimating equations (4) and (5) for goodwill-impairing firms
and the matching samples of control firms. Exploratory factor analysis in Section 4.3 aggregated
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triggering event variables into 3 factors. Factors 1 and 3 are positively correlated with firm-level
disclosures, while Factor 2 is strongly influenced by the economy- and industry-related disclosure.
Table 5.3 reveals that Factor 3 is significantly positive on day 0, while Factor 1 becomes positive
and significant on day 1. Factor 2, which is positively correlated with economic- and industry-level
factors, is insignificant during both days. This result strongly supports Hypothesis 1a. Positive and
significant coefficients on firm-level disclosure factors indicate increased information content of
firm-specific disclosures relative to the economy- and industry-level ones. Results for the ATV OL
measure imply the same inferences, lending support to Hypothesis 1b. Factor 3 is the only factor in
this specification with statistically significant positive coefficient. Taken together, the evidence from
factor-specific tests suggests that firm-level triggering event disclosure is associated with an increase
in the information content of goodwill impairment announcements as measured by abnormal return
volatility and abnormal trading volume.
5.3 Market Microstructure Effects of Goodwill Impairment Disclosure
To test my hypotheses related to market asymmetry, I first compare bid-ask spread and liquidity
behavior around goodwill impairment announcement dates for goodwill-impairing, positive goodwill
and zero goodwill firms. Results are depicted in Figure 5.5. I do not find significant evidence of
changes in bid-ask spreads during the extended time before the disclosure, rejecting hypotheses 2
and 3. This result is consistent with the idea that trading before the disclosure date is not based on
the private information about an impairment leaked to the market before the earnings announcement.
However, consistent with the theoretical predictions of (Kim and Verrecchia, 1994), I find that
bid-ask spreads increase at the time of joint goodwill impairment/earnings announcements and
return to previous levels several days after impairment disclosure.2 Differences in bid-ask spread
2Some triggering events (Expectation of lower future performance, New legislation/regulation and others
related to firm-specific disclosures) demonstrate increases in bid-ask spreads in days leading up to the announcement.
For example, Rising costs (see Figure 5.6c) shows initial increase in bid-ask spreads between the days -2 and -1. This
is consistent with (Kim and Verrecchia, 1994)’s prediction that the market maker raises bid-ask spreads to price-protect
against the pre-disclosure information asymmetry after observing an order flow from traders.
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increases are significant across all three groups of firms. Among the triggering event subgroups (see
Figure 5.6), firms that disclose impairment indicators such as Major Customer Loss, Rising
Costs and Strategic Change experience the largest increase in bid-ask spreads. Impairment
recognition without further disclosure (Not Disclosed) also results in a significant bid-ask spread
increase (see Table 5.4).
Overall, the evidence suggests that goodwill impairment disclosure does not reduce information
asymmetry, but rather temporarily increases it around announcement dates. This finding strongly
supports Hypothesis 4 and is consistent with (Kim and Verrecchia, 1994)’s idea that certain dis-
closures provide information that allows sophisticated traders to make judgments about a firm’s
performance that are superior to the judgments of other traders. In particular, the disclosure of
firm-specific private information or the decision not to disclose any details about an impairment
seem to constitute the main incentives for expert traders to acquire/produce new private information
about a goodwill-impairing firm.
As for liquidity, different triggering events are associated with different changes in liquidity
around goodwill impairment announcements. Disclosure of Major Customer Loss, Rising
Costs and Competition is related to a post-announcement decrease in liquidity. Firms that choose
not to disclose details about their goodwill impairment decision experience decrease in liquidity
as well. Disclosure of economy- and industry-related triggering events have no effect on liquidity
levels. Combined with evidence on changes in bid-ask spreads, presented results strongly support
Hypothesis 5, suggesting that firm-specific goodwill impairment disclosure is associated with
post-announcement information asymmetry changes, while disclosure related to information that
might be publicly available elsewhere is not.
5.4 Tests of the Predictive Power of Goodwill Impairment Disclosure
Table 5.5 presents results of the proportional hazard model estimation to assess whether
goodwill impairment-related disclosures at time t have significant effects on a probability of
goodwill impairment happening in subsequent periods t+n.
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Hazard ratios can be interpreted almost exactly like odds ratios in logistic regression (Allison
(2010)). For indicator variables with values of 1 and 0, as is the case with triggering events in
this study, the hazard ratio is interpreted as a ratio of the estimated hazard for those with a value
of 1 to the estimated hazard for those with a value of 0 (controlling for the other covariates). For
example, the estimated hazard ratio for Factor 3, which is highly positively correlated with firm-level
disclosures, is 12.42. This means that the hazard of a subsequent goodwill impairment recognition
for firms that disclosed triggering events correlated with Factor 3 is 12.42 times higher than for
firms that did not make such disclosure. Factor’s 3 significantly positive coefficient also indicates a
shorter time to next impairment for firms disclosing firm-specific reasons for goodwill impairment
decisions. Factors 1 and 2 have insignificant coefficients indicating that disclosures related to
firm-level operational performance and economy- and industry-related triggering events do not have
significant effects on subsequent goodwill impairment recognition.
As for the control variables, they generally follow previous research findings. The presence
of a Bonus in CEO’s compensation reduces the probability of subsequent goodwill write-down
and extends the time to next impairment, as does the presence of a debt covenant. CEO tenure,
however, demonstrates a result that goes against previous findings. In particular, both the hazard
ratio and significantly positive coefficient for this variable indicate that the longer the CEO’s tenure,
the higher the probability of a subsequent goodwill impairment. Note, however, that the setting of
this hazard model analyzes a sequence of multiple impairments by each firm unlike previous models
that treat each impairment as a single separate event. Keeping this in mind, it seems reasonable to
expect eventual goodwill impairment recognition even if managers apply discretion in terms of write-
down timing. Managers can exercise discretion and choose to delay impairment recognition, but
they cannot avoid it completely when clear economic impairment indicators are eventually present.
Additionally, longer CEO tenure indicates more managerial experience, including experience with
asset impairment recognition decisions. This explanation is supported by findings of (Li et al., 2011)
that document more frequent goodwill impairments of smaller magnitudes during the post-SFAS
142 period.
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Table 5.5: Hazard Model Estimates of the Predictive Power of Individual Triggering Event Disclo-
sures and Factor groupings.
Specification Covariates
Parameter
Estimate P-value
Hazard
Ratio
Individual Triggering Economic Factors -0.09 0.87 0.91
Events Industry Factors -0.52 0.1 0.59
Decline in market cap -1.72 0.01 0.18
Poor operational performance 0.37 0.18 1.46
Expectation of low performance 0.58 0.19 1.78
Competition -0.39 0.16 0.67
Major customer loss 1.62 0.05 5.05
Asset sale/expectation of sale -0.53 0.25 0.58
Business restructuring -0.53 0.3 0.58
Rising costs -0.43 0.49 0.64
Strategic change -0.53 0.31 0.59
Not disclosed -0.35 0.65 0.7
Recognition after denial 1.59 0.01 4.92
Size 0.11 0.54 1.11
Leverage -0.19 0.37 0.82
Debt covenant -0.36 0.41 0.56
Tenure -0.01 0.84 0.99
Bonus -0.001 0.26 1
MngmtChange 0.45 0.25 1.58
Imp Prev Q 19.22 0.0001 2.229
GDPChange US -64.42 0.0001 0
GDPChange EU -53.47 0.0001 1.668
Will5000 -4.85 0.01 0.008
VIX 1.67 0.0002 1.18
Factor Groupings Factor 1 0.17 0.85 1.19
Factor 2 1.41 0.24 4.12
Factor 3 7.12 0.005 12.42
Size 0.09 0.61 1.13
Leverage 0.24 0.25 1.28
Debt covenant -0.13 0.09 0.80
Tenure 0.12 0.08 1.13
Bonus -0.03 0.0003 0.97
MngmtChange 2.57 0.12 13.08
ImpPrevQ 20.33 0.0001 6.75
GDPChUS -0.05 0.87 0.95
GDPChEU -0.04 0.15 0.71
Will5000Ch -2.87 0.26 0.55
VIXCh 0.01 0.5 1.01
This table presents the results of estimating equations (4.6) and (4.7) on a subsample of firms with multiple impairments.
The dependent variable is a function hi(t) which defines a hazard of subsequent impairment for company i. Control
variables are as defined in Table 3.1.
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Figure 5.3: Market reaction to goodwill impairment disclosure that names economy-wide devel-
opments, competition or decline in market capitalization as a triggering event. Positive and zero
goodwill firms represent companies matched to impairing firms by size and industry. Left panels
present results for abnormal trading volume, right panels – for abnormal return volatility.
(a) ATVOL: economy-wide developments (b) ARVOL: economy-wide developments
(c) ATVOL: competition (d) ARVOL: competition
(e) ATVOL: decline in market cap (f) ARVOL: decline in market cap
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Figure 5.4: Bid-ask spreads and market liquidity around earnings announcement days of positive
goodwill and zero goodwill firms in 1991-2001, i.e. before SFAS 142 introduction. Market liquidity
is measured by the Amihud measure. Left panel demonstrates bid-ask spreads, right panel shows
Amihud measure.
Figure 5.5: Bid-ask spreads and market liquidity around goodwill impairment/earnings announce-
ment days of goodwill-impairing, positive goodwill and zero goodwill firms in 2003-2013, i.e.
after SFAS 142 introduction. Market liquidity is measured by the Amihud measure. Left panel
demonstrates bid-ask spreads, right panel shows Amihud measure.
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Figure 5.6: Bid-ask spreads and market liquidity around goodwill impairment/earnings announce-
ment days of goodwill-impairing, positive goodwill and zero goodwill firms in 2003-2013. Goodwill-
impairing group of firms consists only of those that disclosed major customer loss, rising costs as
a triggering event or did not disclose any details about a goodwill write-down. Market liquidity
is measured by the Amihud measure. Left panel demonstrates bid-ask spreads, right panel shows
Amihud measure.
(a) BAS: major customer loss (b) Amihud: major customer loss
(c) BAS: rising costs (d) Amihud: rising costs
(e) BAS: not disclosed (f) Amihud: not disclosed
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CHAPTER 6
CONCLUSIONS
This paper studies the information content of SFAS 142-mandated disclosures. In particular,
the hand-collected sample contains information on triggering events that firms disclose at the time
of a goodwill impairment announcement. Tests of the market reaction to such announcements reveal
several findings. First, market reaction to a firm’s decision to impair goodwill differs depending
on the underlying triggering event cited by a firm. This finding may explain previous mixed
evidence on market reactions to goodwill impairment recognition. While some triggering events are
associated with significant market response, others demonstrate insignificant relation. Moreover,
abnormal return volatility and abnormal trading volume indicate that different triggering events
may influence each of these measures separately, suggesting that underlying impairment reasons
have a differential impact on the average change in investors’ beliefs and idiosyncratic reactions of
individual investors. Thus, goodwill impairment market response test results may imply different
inferences depending on the employed market reaction measures, sample timing and triggering
events cited by firms at the time of goodwill impairment announcements. Second, initial evidence
suggests that SFAS 142 altered market response to earnings announcements for firms with positive
goodwill balances. During post-SFAS 142 period, positive goodwill firms experience stronger
earnings announcement reactions compared to firms without goodwill. This result holds for both
goodwill-impairing and non-impairing firms. Finally, I demonstrate that firm-level triggering
events are significantly associated with future goodwill impairments when a company records
multiple impairments. The presence of significant associations between current triggering events
and the likelihood of subsequent goodwill write-downs indicate that financial statements provide
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information that helps investors to gain a better understanding of a firm’s subsequent performance,
as intended by FASB at the time of SFAS 142 introduction.
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